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ABSTRACT:  How does the introduction of rural public work schemes impact individual 
incentives to migrate? This paper examines this question in the context of rural public 
work program (Yigong-daizhen) in China, and unveils empirical evidence that suggest 
that the introduction of Yigong-daizhen projects in fact stimulates outmigration at the 
village level, after controlling for village characteristics and project types. By 
furthermore accounting for the endogeneity of Yigong-daizhen placement, the impact of 
such projects is found to be even larger. These results are consistent with household 
migration behavior in the presence of significant cost of migration, and credit market 
imperfection. 
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I. Introduction 
A distinctive feature of the Chinese economic growth experience has been the 
massive increase in rural migrant work force living in China’s cities since the onset of 
economic reforms in the 1980’s. By 2007, the estimated number of rural migrants 
exceeded over 135 million (Meng et al., 2010). The mobilization of this sizeable 
workforce has wide-ranging consequences, including contributions to the growth of 
export industries (Chan, 2008), shifts in income distribution between urban and rural 
China (Ha et al., 2009), and changes in educational and health outcomes over time 
between migrants and non-migrants (Lee, 2011), for example. The depth and breadth of 
these research studies concerning the consequences of rural-urban migration in China 
contrast sharply with the relatively limited number of studies on the effectiveness of 
migration policies in China. Indeed, much of the policy discourse on China’s internal 
migration policy has focused on the hukou system of household registration (Chan, 
2008). As a first objective of this paper, we examine the role of rural public work 
schemes as an alternative migration regulatory mechanism in the Chinese context.   
 To the best of our knowledge, this is a first attempt at an empirical assessment of 
the role of Yigong-daizhen programs on the pattern of migration in China. As a 
contribution to policy analysis, in view of the massive influx of rural migrants into 
China’s urban cities, whether these rural public work schemes serve as deterrents that 
mitigate the size of the migrant flow, or in fact further intensify out migration is a 
question of critical policy importance. As a contribution to the economics of migration, 
this paper brings together three strands of the literature not often discussed together: labor 
market consequence of public work schemes, determinants of regional migration, and 
behavior in the presence of credit market imperfection.   
 By a public work scheme, we refer to the public provision of employment 
opportunities resulting in the creation of public goods, such as roads and schools. These 
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employment opportunities serve as a form of social safety net, at a prescribed wage for 
those unable to find alternative employment. Worldwide, the implementation of public 
work schemes spans transition countries, developing countries and developed countries 
(Betcherman et al., 2004). A number such public work schemes, such as the Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS), and more recently the Mahatma Gandhi 
Employment Guarantee Schemes in India, have attracted much academic and policy 
attention, (Acharya, 1990; Ravallion et al., 1993; Gaiha, 1996a, b, 2000; Basu et al., 
2009). Research on the labor market consequences of these more well-known public 
work schemes has so far focused on employment, earnings, and targeting. 1,2,3 
 By contrast, the labor market consequence of public work schemes in China is a 
far less well-understood topic. Specifically, Yigong-daizhen -- to offer job opportunities 
instead of sheer relief -- is a public work scheme initiated in the mid-1980s a part of the 
Chinese government’s poverty reduction programs (Rozelle et al., 1998). Research on the 
effectiveness of these programs has been very limited. Two exceptions are Park et al. 
(2002) and Zhu and Jiang (1995), emphasizing respectively the targeting effectiveness, 
and the earnings impact of Yigong-daizhen programs. 4,5 While offering valuable insights, 
neither of these studies identify program-specific effects due mainly to data limitation. In 
addition, identification also requires proper accounting of endogeneity of program 
selection among participating villages or county – these are issues that we will pay 
particular attention to in our analysis in the sequel.  
 This paper is also related to a rapidly growing literature on the determinants of 
inter-regional migration in China. Some of these determinants include the potential role 
of   farmland shortages and availability of household labor (Zhao, 1999a), earning 
differences between destinations and origins (Zhao, 1999b; Zhu, 2002; Zhang and Song, 
2003), as well as the cost of migration (Zhang and Song, 2003) whether monetary or 
psychic (Sjaastad, 1962). At the household level, participating in migration has been 
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shown to significantly raise per capita income as high as 16 to 43 percent (Taylor et al., 
2003). Open questions abound. In particular, what roles do policies play in regulating the 
direction and size of the flow of internal migrants in China? Indeed, how do the direct 
provision of employment opportunities and the provision of public goods in rural villages 
impact the outflow of migrants from rural areas? 6 
 Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on behavior in the presence of 
credit market imperfection. In a wide variety of settings, credit market imperfections have 
been shown to fundamentally alter the properties of equilibrium, giving rise for example 
to non-monotonic, and / or distributionally sensitive comparative statics responses (Galor 
and Zeira, 1993; Matsuyama, 2008). In the context of migration, credit market 
imperfection is expected to play a critical role particularly when the upfront cost of 
migration is significant. Indeed, several studies (Du et al., 2005; McKenzie and Rapaport, 
2007) document an inverted-U shape relationship between household endowments and 
migration likelihood. That is, households with middle wealth are more willing to and able 
to migrate.  
 Following the lessons that can be drawn from these three strands of literature, we 
argue that Yigong-daizhen programs introduce two opposing forces on the village level 
propensity for outmigration. By increasing available employment opportunities and 
raising earnings and production efficiency through public goods provision in general, 
Yigong-daizhen programs narrows the expected earnings gap between destination and 
sending locations, thus potentially discouraging outmigration. Going in the opposite 
direction, by raising individual / household’s ability to pay for the cost of migration, due 
either to the improvements in earnings thanks to Yigong-daizhen programs in the face of 
credit market imperfection that has previously deterred attempts to migrate, or to public 
construction that directly decreases the cost of migration by improving transportation and 
building roads, public work schemes can in fact stimulate outmigration. On balance, the 
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net outcome of Yigong-daizhen programs on village level outmigration will in the end 
depend on the relative strength of these two effects.7   
 In this paper, we take this issue to the data using the Center for Chinese 
Agricultural Policy (CCAP) 2003 Village Survey, covering 2,459 villages in six 
provinces in China (Jiangsu, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Hebei and Jilin in the year of 
2003. We are interested in assessing the outmigration impact of introducing Yigong-
daizhen programs at the village level. In order to identify program-specific effects, we 
employ a difference in difference approach. To furthermore account for the issue of 
endogenous program selection, we employ a 2SLS approach with instrumental variables. 
In a series of regressions, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that Yigong-
daizhen programs have in fact facilitated the outmigration of workers. Consistent with Du 
et al. (2005) and McKenzie and Rapaport (2007) and the implications of models with 
significant cost of migration and imperfect credit markets, we also find an inverted U-
shape relationship between average per capita income and outmigration at the village 
level. Finally, to address the potential heterogeneity of Yigong-daizhen programs across 
villages, we work with four restricted samples: (A) villages with productivity improving 
public projects, such as irrigation system improvement, drainage system improvement, 
soil improvement, small-scale water conservation and terrace construction projects, (B) 
villages without productivity improving public projects,  (C) villages with migration cost 
decreasing public investments through roads and bridge construction projects, and (D) 
villages without roads and bridge construction projects. The impacts of Yigong-daizhen 
programs on outmigration in these specifications continue to be positive and significant, 
and indeed, the impact of Yigong-daizhen in villages with newly constructed roads is 
positive and larger than the other villages. These findings suggest the potentially critical 
roles that cost of migration and credit market imperfections play in the determination of 
the inter-regional flow of migrants in China. 
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 The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section II describes the 
institutional background of Yigong-daizhen program in China. Section III provides the 
summary of statistics of the data used in this paper. Section IV discusses about the 
identification strategy. Section V shows the empirical findings and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Country Background 
 The Yigong-daizhen program in China was initiated in the mid-1980s by the 
Chinese government as part of the rural poverty-reduction programs. Table 1 shows the 
types of projects, the amount of investment and the achievements of Yigong-daizhen 
projects from 1985 to 2000. In terms of program goals, there are mainly four general 
categories, including rural land construction and irrigation system construction, road 
construction, drinking water facilities improvements and small-scale water conservation. 
Forestry and meadow maintenance, river and lake conservation are also included in the 
Yigong-daizhen project schemes from 1985 to 1995. 
 The amount of investment on each category of Yigong-daizhen projects is also 
presented in Table 1. Rural land construction, irrigation system construction, as well as 
road construction take up around 60 per cent of the total investment in 1985-1995, and 
around 80 per cent of the total investment in 1995-2000. Total investment in Yigong-
daizhen projects is substantial, amounting to 2.62 billion yuan, or around US$ 0.38 
billion.  
 The Chinese central government provided both monetary and in-kind investments. 
Table 2 shows the types of in-kind investment made by the government, such as cereals, 
cloth, edible oil, grains and medium- and low-grade consumer goods. In the year 2005, 
the Regulation of Yigong-daizhen Projects was implemented (NDRC, 2005). The 
legislation laid out the regulations that governed the implementation of Yigong-daizhen 
projects. Before the end of each calendar year, the Development and Reform Commission 
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at the provincial level are to report to the National Development and Reform Commission 
about project plans for Yigong-daizhen in the following year. Furthermore, the National 
Development and Reform Commission are expected to prepare a national level Yigong-
daizhen projects plan according to the various economic condition of each province. In 
terms of payments to contracted laborers, the Regulation of Yigong-daizhen projects 
stipulates that wages should be paid without delay and default. In some provinces, such 
as Sichuan, information on each Yigong-daizhen project, including source of funding, 
expected outcomes, as well as implementation year of the projects are published online 
and made open for public scrutiny. 
 The main difference between the Yigong-daizhen programs in China and other 
public work schemes, such as the EGS program in India, is the wage rate paid to the 
employed workers and the potential impact that this has on inter-regional migration. It is 
documented that the wage paid to the unskilled day laborers in the local villages was 
around 10 yuan (around 1.5 USD) per day during the year 1998 to 2002. This was much 
lower than the wage of migrant workers (Luo et al., 2007). For example, in the rural area 
of Sichuan province in 1995, an out-migrant helped to increase an average of 2,388 yuan 
more of household earnings than a non-migrants per year, relative to an average net 
income per capita of 1354.66 yuan and an average household size around 4, or around 10 
yuan per day assuming that a worker works five days a week (Zhao, 1999a). Thus, a 
rural-urban wage gap continued to exist, and remained large despite the introduction of 
Yigong-daizhen programs. By contrast, the EGS in Neelamangalam, India, for example, 
pays the minimum wage at 80 rupees a days, a figure very close to the day wages of 
unskilled migrants, which could be less than 100 rupees a day (Naomi, 2008). 
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III. Data Description 
 The village level data used in this paper is obtained from Center for Chinese 
Agricultural Policy (CCAP) 2003 Village Survey. It surveyed 2,459 villages in six 
provinces in China, namely Jiangsu, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Hebei and Jilin in the year 
of 2003. The survey collected a great deal of information about village affairs. In addition 
to the basic village characteristics, the survey collected information on village level 
public goods investment, governance systems, as well as the general regulatory 
environment, such as 1) the attitude of upper government toward violation of One Child 
Policy, 2) whether women married into the village are eligible for land allocation and 3) 
how long it generally takes to get a license for small business, for example.  
 In China, the key items of public investment in the rural villages are often related 
to basic infrastructure improvement, such as road construction, irrigation system 
improvement, school construction and so on. Table 3 shows the summary statistics for all 
the village public projects of the 2,459 surveyed villages. Across all 10,967 public 
projects implemented during 1998-2002, road and bridge construction projects represent 
up to 14.2 per cent of the overall number of projects. In addition, roads and bridges 
construction, along with electricity and telephone facilities, and Grain for Green projects 
constitutes more than half (53.82%) of the overall projects. 8 
 Table 3 also reports the average amount of investment, the average labor used in 
the projects and the number of benefitted households. The average investment of a 
project for the whole sample is 158,918 yuan (about 23,370 USD.) Telephone and 
electricity facilities are the costliest projects in terms of average investment. The average 
labor used is 887.33 day laborers per project, and soil improvement projects are the most 
labor intensive. The average number of benefitting households is 262.95 per project. 
Across all projects, road and bridge construction projects have the widest coverage 
benefitting an average of 459.15 households per project. 
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   As a subset of these public investment projects dedicated to alleviating rural 
poverty in China, Yigong-daizhen is a public work scheme initiated in1984. 9 The funding 
of the Yigong-daizhen projects is allocated to the local governments for local 
infrastructure construction using local laborers, where the payment to the laborers 
accounts for around 20 per cent of the total funding, at a wage around 10 yuan (around 
1.5 USD) per person per day (Luo et al., 2007). 
 Table 4 displays program related summary statistics exclusively related to 
Yigong-daizhen projects. There are in total 549 Yigong-daizhen projects between 1998 
and 2002 in our sample. Among the 549 projects, 148 (26.96%) projects are roads and 
bridges construction. Electricity and drinking water facilities are the second and third 
popular projects in terms of the type of the Yigong-daizhen projects. The average 
investment of a Yigong-daizhen project is 17,249.05 yuan, and this represents around 11 
per cent of the average investment of all the public investment projects. The average 
labor used of a Yigong-daizhen project is 1,534.51 day laborers per project, which is 
almost doubled compared to the average labor used of all the public projects. On average 
a Yigong-daizhen project benefits 342.9 households, higher than the average coverage of 
all the public investment projects. 
 
IV. Econometric Issues and Identification Strategies 
 Heterogeneity by Income Quartiles 
 Our empirical estimation tests the impact of Yigong-daizhen on village level 
outmigration. As argued earlier in the introduction and demonstrated formally in Qin 
(2011), the impact of Yigong-daizhen on outmigration behavior will depend critically on 
(i) the cost of migration, and (ii) the presence of credit market imperfection. With 
significant upfront cost of migration and imperfect credit markets, we would expect 
Yigong-daizhen projects to have a positive impact on the number of outmigrants in the 
12 
 
village. By contrast, if there is perfect credit market in the village that no households are 
bound by credit constraints, then improving employment prospects and earnings via 
Yigong-daizhen projects should have the opposing effect of decreasing the number of out-
migrants. Importantly, the relative importance of the cost of migration and of imperfect 
credit markets is likely dependent on the average income of the village in question. To 
capture the potential heterogeneity in program impact by average per capita income in a 
village, we will provide quartile specific estimates of the impact of Yigong-daizhen 
projects on out-migration. 
 Heterogeneity by Program Characteristics 
 As discussed earlier in Section I, different public investment projects should be 
expected to have different implications on the urban-rural wage gap, and the cost of 
migration in the Yigong-daizhen villages. In particular, productivity improving projects 
such as irrigation system improvement, drainage system improvement, soil improvement, 
small-scale water conservation and terrace construction projects may be viewed 
productivity improving, potentially narrowing the urban-rural wage gap. Other programs 
such as road and bridge construction may be seen more as migration cost reducing. To 
account for program-specific heterogeneity across Yigong-daizhen projects, we will 
examine four restricted panels. The first includes only villages with five types of 
‘productivity improvement’ projects. The second is the complementary set with villages 
that lack ‘productivity improvement’ projects. The third panel includes only villages with 
road and bridge construction projects, and as such, are more likely to experience 
migration cost reduction. The fourth panel includes the complementary set of the third 
restricted sample, i.e., villages without road and bridge construction projects during the 
survey periods.  
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 Endogenous Program Selection 
 Naturally, whether Yigong-daizhen projects are implemented in a village is likely 
to depend on village characteristics. Based on information available from our sample, 
Yigong-daizhen projects are more likely to be implemented in villages with more surplus 
laborers and less income per capita if it is correctly targeted. Table 5 shows the 
differences in village characteristics by Yigong-daizhen status. Results from t-tests 
between the two groups show that villages with Yigong-daizhen projects on average have 
significantly lower net income per capita, larger village size (higher total population), 
higher proportion of land steeper than 25 degrees, longer distance from the village 
committee (usually locating near the center of the village) to the nearest tarred road and 
more fellow villagers working at township. These suggest strongly that the endogeneity 
of program placement needs to be accounted for in our econometric model.  
 Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 Due to data limitation, we do not have information on the implementation of 
Yigong-daizhen projects in the surveyed villages prior to year 1997. Thus, it is likely that 
labor market equilibrium in the villages was affected not only by the Yigong-daizhen 
projects implemented during year 1998-2002, but also by the ones implemented before 
1997. To mitigate the impact of these unobservable differences across villages, we opt to 
take the difference between the outcome variables in 2002 and 1997 using the balanced 
panel data. Assuming that the long term impacts of such projects do not vary significantly 
across years, the resulting estimates should provide an unbiased assessment of the impact 
of Yigong-daizhen projects.   
 In view of these econometric issues and identification challenges, we will provide 
first a series of baseline OLS regressions of a difference in difference model with and 
without provincial fixed effects. The Difference-in-Difference specification is as follows: 
∆Outmig୧ ൌ α ൅ βଵYGDZ୧		 ൅ βଶVillage୧,ଵଽଽ଻ ൅	෍γ୩Project, k ൅	෍ϕ୩Province, k ൅ ε୧ 
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where ∆Outmig୧ is the change in the number of out-migrants in village i  between year 
1997 and 2002. 10 YGDZ୧		is a binary variable that indicates whether Yigong-daizhen 
projects had been implemented in village i  between 1998-2002.
11 Village୧,ଵଽଽ଻ controls 
for socio-economic, demographic, governance, and transportation related village level 
characteristics in year 1997 that we take as proxy for various push factors of migration. 
These include net income per capita (yuan in natural log), squared income per capita 
(yuan in natural log) in 1997, the number of illiterates, total population, the distance from 
village committee seat to township government seat, the number of fellow villagers 
working at the upper government (township government,) and whether there are tarred 
roads passing through the village.12 As there were 19 types of public investment projects 
in the surveyed villages, Project, k controls for project type fixed effects, that is, 
Project, k ൌ 1 if a type k project had been implemented in the villages during 1998-2002, 
otherwise Project, k ൌ 0. Province, k controls for provincial fixed effects. ε୧ is an error 
term.13 
 In order to deal with the endogeneity of the non-random placement of Yigong-
daizhen projects, we will additionally provide estimates based on Two-Stage Least 
Square to instrument for the placement of Yigong-daizhen projects. Specifically, the first 
stage is:   
YGDZ୧ ൌ α′ ൅ λଵVillage′୧,ଵଽଽ଻ ൅	λଶVillage୧,ଵଽଽ଻ ൅෍γ′୩Project, k ൅	෍ϕ′୩Province, k ൅ ε୧ 
where Village′୧,ଵଽଽ଻ includes a set of village characteristics that are likely to be 
exogenous, but potentially correlated with the implementation of Yigong-daizhen 
projects. These include land acreage, terrace acreage, forest acreage, the number of 
households with access to tap water, the number of households with access to telephone, 
the distance from the village to road and the proportion of flat areas in the village.14 As 
we are not aware of any official policies regarding the selection process of Yigong-
daizhen programs into villages ex ante, we aim to include a variety of exogenous village 
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characteristics in the first stage estimation to capture the relationship, most of which are 
geographical variables. The first set of such instruments include factors such as the 
acreage of land, terrace and forest, and the proportion of flat areas in the village, which 
describes the topography of the surveyed villages. First, topography may affect the scale 
and productivity of agricultural production. For example, villages with larger acreage of 
land are likely to be more devoted to agricultural production. Villages with proportionally 
more flat areas in the village are more likely to have higher productivity in the 
agricultural sector. Furthermore, the number of surplus labor is likely also dependent on 
topography, which in turn impact the likelihood of the placement of Yigong-daizhen 
programs. The second set of instruments capture the) remoteness of villages, such as the 
number of households with access to tap water, the number of households with access to 
telephone, the distance from the village to road. As remote villages are more likely to be 
poor and lack infrastructure, they are more likely to become the target of Yigong-daizhen 
programs.  
 The second stage is: 
∆Outmig୧ ൌ α ൅ βଵYGDZన		෣ ൅ βଶVillage୧,ଵଽଽ଻ ൅	෍γ୩Project, k ൅	෍ϕ୩Province, k ൅ ε୧ 
where YGDZన		෣  is the predicted value of Yigong-daizhen status from the first stage. Other 
variable definitions are the same as the Difference-in-Difference specification. 
 
V. Empirical Findings 
 Table 6 presents the empirical results for the impact of Yigong-daizhen projects 
on the migration patterns in the villages. Columns 1-4 display the results of OLS 
estimation of the difference in difference setup. Column 1 is the parsimonious 
specification without any control variables, Column 2 controls for village characteristics, 
Column 3 further controls for project type fixed effect and Column 4 controls for both 
project type and province fixed effects. Column 5 displays the result of the 2SLS 
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estimation. It can be seen from the first row of Table 6 that the introduction of Yigong-
daizhen projects had a positive and significant impact on the number of out-migrants in 
the village. After controlling for village characteristics in the year 1997 and the types of 
public project in the village, the introduction of Yigong-daizhen projects on average led to 
an increase of around 28 local laborers migrating out in the subsequent years as shown in 
Column 3. The significance and magnitude of coefficients decrease after controlling for 
provincial fixed effect. But the p-value of the coefficient on Yigong-daizhen projects is 
only slightly above 0.10 (p=0.102.) While for the 2SLS estimation, the coefficient on 
Yigong-daizhen is much larger than the OLS estimates, which may be attributed to a 
relatively low F statistic (7.17) in the first stage. But the coefficient is significant at the 
0.1 level after controlling for types of project and province fixed effect.  
 In addition to the main coefficient related to the impact of Yigong-daizhen, the 
coefficients on village characteristics are of interests as well. For example, the linear term 
of per capita income in year 1997 is significantly positive, while the squared term of per 
capita income is significantly negative, which suggests that there exists an inverted U-
shape between per capita income and migration probability. The estimation of turning 
point is consistently around 615 yuan according to column 3 and 4. Furthermore, and as 
should be expected, higher population leads to more out-migrants in the village. Better 
road access also encourages out-migration. 
   Table 7 exhibits OLS estimation results by different income quartiles. As 2SLS 
estimation reports low first-stage F statistic in these sub-sample estimates due to 
insufficient observations, we do not have confidence in the 2SLS estimation thus do not 
report the results here. The coefficients for Yigong-daizhen are positive and significant 
for the second and third quartile by income in 1997 without controlling for provincial 
fixed effects. In addition, the magnitude of the coefficient for the third quartile is larger 
than its counterpart in the whole-sample estimation. These estimates provide some 
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evidence on credit constraints as the households neither too poor nor too rich are the most 
likely ones to migrate out given the cash income from the public work projects. A 
potential drawback of the by-quartile regression is that sharp decrease in the number of 
observations per regression. Indeed, once separated by quartile, the Yigong-daizhen 
coefficient is no longer significant after controlling for provincial fixed effects, though 
the sign of the estimated coefficient remain positive for all except the second quartile. 
 Table 8 presents the results concerning ‘increasing productivity’ and ‘reducing 
cost’ hypotheses. Panel A and B test the hypothesis of ‘increasing productivity’ as a 
mechanism of Yigong-daizhen projects. In Panel A, we use a restricted sample including 
villages with five types of ‘productivity improvement’ projects: irrigation system 
improvement, drainage system improvement, soil improvement, small-scale water 
conservation and terrace construction projects. We exclude projects which may not have 
effects in the short run, such as school and clinic construction. In addition, we exclude the 
Grain for Green projects as they mainly benefit the downstream villages. In Panel B, we 
use the complementary set of the restricted sample in Panel A as a comparable group.   
 The findings in Panel A suggest that the impact of Yigong-daizhen on the number 
of out-migrants in the villages is uniformly positive and significant in the four 
specifications. Comparing panels A and B, the coefficients do not seem to differ 
significantly in the two panels without controlling for provincial fixed effects. However, 
the impact of Yigong-daizhen is not significant in Panel B after adding the provincial 
fixed effects, in stark contrast with the estimation in Panel A. This lends some credibility 
to the hypothesis that productivity improvement is a key mechanism by which public 
work projects impact the behavior of potential migrant workers. Specifically, an increase 
in local productivity will lead to an increase of domestic wage, which may help release 
the credit constraint of the poor, thus enabling more migration. 
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 Panel C of Table 8 only includes the villages with road and bridge construction 
projects during 1998-2002. These villages are more likely to experience migration cost 
reduction through better connectivity to neighbor cities and villages. The coefficients on 
Yigong-daizhen in the villages with newly constructed roads are positive and larger than 
the other villages, though the coefficients are not significant for both groups after 
controlling for province fixed effect. While in panel D, which includes only the villages 
without such migration cost reduction projects, the impact of Yigong-daizhen on 
outmigration is not significant at all. Thus, the above estimates provide us with some 
confidence that cost reduction may be a channel for the positive impact of Yigong-
daizhen projects on the flow of out-migrants. 
    
VI. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we present the impact of public work schemes in China, Yigong-
daizhen, on the outmigration of labor at the village level. The results show that the 
introduction of Yigong-daizhen projects in the villages stimulates the outflow of migrant 
workers from affected villages. The impact of such projects is even larger after 
accounting for the endogeneity of Yigong-daizhen placement. These results are consistent 
with the predictions of a model of migration behavior in the presence of significant 
migration cost, and credible market imperfection (Qin 2011). The positive impact of 
Yigong-daizhen continues to be robust upon controlling for potential heterogeneity of 
program effect across income quartiles. Specifically, we find evidence suggesting that the 
impact of Yigong-daizhen on migration is most important for the middle class, which is in 
consistent with the inverted-U shaped relationship between migration and income level in 
the presence of capital market imperfect.  The robustness of the positive impact of 
Yigong-daizhen remains upon accounting for heterogeneity in program characteristics, 
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most important in villages with productivity improvement projects (such as construction 
of irrigation system) and cost reduction projects (such as road construction.)  
 Our findings also reveal two observations that suggest that the present set of 
results should be interpreted with caution and that additional research with better 
identification techniques and broader data coverage should be encouraged. In particular, 
in regressions that do not control for the endogeneity of program selection, the 
significance (but not the sign with one singular exception in Table 7) of the impact of 
Yigong-daizhen on out-migration is sensitive to the introduction of provincial fixed 
effects. However, upon accounting for endogenous program selection, the impact of 
Yigong-daizhen on outmigration continues to be positive and significant. Future research 
with ideally a broader data coverage should devote particular attention to possible 
province-specific effects of the impact of Yigong-daizhen on outmigration. In addition, 
for the 2SLS regression in Table 6, the first stage F statistic is 7.17, which is slightly 
lower than the commonly accepted criterion of 10 (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). As well, 
with a substantially reduced number of observations in each income quartile and each 
project panel, the 2SLS estimations cannot be applied in the restricted (income quartile 
specific / program characteristic specific) samples for the F-statistics are too small. 
Alternative identification techniques with better instruments and broader data coverage, 
for example, should be applied in future research. 
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Notes 
1. Betcherman et al. (2004) summarises the impact evaluation results of 20 public work 
programs worldwide. The 20 public work programs cover transition countries, 
developing countries and developed countries. The results concerning the impact on 
employment and earnings are both mixed. Among the 18 studies with impact 
evaluation on employment, seven of them find that public work programs have 
positive impact on the level of employment. For example, Walsh et al. (2001) 
investigate the Temporary Employment Program in the period of 1998 to 1999 in 
Bulgaria and find that there is a 2.5 per cent net impact of improving the chance of 
the unemployed to have a regular job.  
2. Suggested by Betcherman et al. (2004), of the two studies with impact evaluation on 
earnings (Benus and Rodriguez-Planas, 2002; Jalan and Ravallion, 2002), the 
evaluation evidence regarding to the impact of public works on earnings is mixed for 
the transition and developing country programs. For example Benus and Rodriguez-
Planas (2002) find that in Romania, the Public Works Community Job Creation 
Program has no impact on wages in the period of 1999-2001. While according to 
Jalan and Ravallion (2002), the Trabajar program in Argentina significantly lifts up 
the net income of the poor participants, where the percentage net gain for the poor 5 
per cent is 74%. Gaiha (1996b) analyzes the impact of EGS on the wages of the poor 
in Maharashtra, India. Program participation is shown to bring significant positive 
effect on agricultural wages of the poor possibly since EGS enables them to bargain 
for higher agricultural wages by improving their fall-back position. Finally, the study 
also finds that EGS program has an income stabilization effect in agriculturally slack 
periods. 
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3. Gaiha (1996b) examines the targeting precision of the EGS program. It is expected 
that EGS program is designed to help the poor by providing them job opportunities. 
However, he finds that the targeting of EGS is no better than the general labor 
market. In other words, the share of the poor among EGS participants is close to the 
share of the poor in the labor force. This evidence is further confirmed in Gaiha 
(2000). In addition, there are more male participants in EGS with a significantly 
higher wage than the female participants. Another interesting finding with respect to 
the participation of the EGS is that the poor people turn to depend less on EGS, or to 
be more likely to withdraw from EGS when the overall economic condition gets 
better.  
4. Park et al. (2002) studies the targeting effectiveness of the three main poverty 
reduction programs, namely the Yigong-daizhen program, the subsidised loan 
program and the budgetary grant program. They find that for both Yigong-daizhen 
program and the subsidised loan program, the amount of fund allocation to poor 
counties is not significantly correlated with income levels. Only the budgetary grant 
program is progressive. In addition, they find that being designated as a poor county 
increases the growth in rural income per capita by 2.28 per cent per year during the 
period of 1985-1992 and 0.91 per cent during the period of 1992-1995. 
5. Zhu and Jiang (1995) is the only paper that estimates the impact of Yigong-daizhen 
program in China with data from three counties. This study finds that Yigong-daizhen 
projects have improved the income of participating households. However, they 
simply compare the difference of average income per capita between participating 
and non-participating households without controlling for village characteristics and 
accounting for program placement endogeneity. 
6. This question has been addressed by Ravallion (1991) for example in the Indian 
context. Specifically, the initial purpose of the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee 
Scheme was to discourage worker migration in the slack seasons and drought affected 
years since some workers would not return in the harvest seasons. Also see Naomi 
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(2008) for evidence on the potential of the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme in India on outmigration propensities.  
7. Kanbur (1981) suggests that a rural development program which increases the rural 
income may indeed increase migration in the villages with imperfect credit market, as 
the poor now have more money to spend on migration if the gain from migration is 
greater than the earnings from local employment. Qin (2011) narrows down the 
concept of rural development programs to public work schemes and provides a 
theoretical framework to analyze the impact of such programs on interregional 
movements of labor.  
8. The objective of Grain for Green projects is to increase forest cover and prevent soil 
erosion on sloped cropland (Uchida et al., 2005).  
9. There are three main differences between Yigong-daizhen projects and other public 
projects in rural China. First and foremost, the funding of Yigong-daizhen projects 
comes from the central government, while the funding of the other public projects 
comes from either the upper government or the villages themselves. Second, the 
laborers hired by Yigong-daizhen projects are the local villagers, unlike the other 
public projects which generally outsourcing to companies outside the village. Third, 
as one of the pro-poor policy, Yigong-daizhen projects are likely to be placed in 
villages with more poor population and less infrastructure (NDRC, 2005). 
10. In the questionnaire, there is a question asking “How many villagers worked outside, 
and lived outside in 1997 and 2002.” We use the change in number of migrants from 
1997 to 2002 in village i  as the measure of ∆Outmig୧.  
11. In the questionnaire, whether Yigong-daizhen program had been implemented in the 
village can be detected from the question “the source of funding of the public 
investment projects.” If the source of funding of any of the public investment project 
in village i  was from Yigong-daizhen program, then the variable YGDZ୧		 will be 
coded as “1” for village i , “0” otherwise. 
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12. In China, each township consists of several administrative villages. And each 
administrative village consists of several natural villages governed by village 
committee. The distance from the village committee seat to township government seat 
measures how isolated a natural village is, which is likely to affect the placement of 
public projects.  
13. The 19 types of public projects are: roads and bridges construction, school 
construction, clinic construction, drinking water facility provision, irrigation system 
improvement, drainage system improvement, electricity infrastructure construction, 
telephone installation, cable TV or loudspeaker installation, soil improvement project, 
small scale water conservation, terrace construction, environment improvement 
project, forest closure project, public forest planting, Grain for Green project, 
meadow construction, recreational center construction and others. 
14. Angrist and Krueger (2001) suggest that using probit or logit as first stage in two-
stage least squares is not necessary and may even do some harm. Specifically, if the 
probit or logit model does not reflect the correct first-stage functional form, the 
second stage estimation will not be consistent. Instead, using a linear regression for 
the first-stage estimates generates consistent second-stage estimates even with a 
dummy endogenous variable.  
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Projects Period Investment(billion yuan) Achievement
Rural Land Construction and
Irrigation System Construction 1985-1995 7.3
Developed new terraces: 21 million mu; Improve low
fertility land: 14 million mu;Improve irrigation:51
million mu.
Road Construction 1985-1995 10.05 Improve rural roads: 214.4 thousands kilometers
Drinking Water Supply Facilities 1985-1995 3.5 Provide drinking water supply for 40.9 million peopleand 33 million livestocks
Forrestry and Meadow Maintenance,
Small-Scale Water Conservation 1985-1995 2.7
Tree Planting: 22.7 million mu; New and improved
meadow: 10 million mu; Small-scale water
conservation: 28 thousands square kilometers
River and Lake Conservation 1991-1995 8
2 billion yuan has been invested annually since the
flood in 1991 to improve the water condition of several
important river and lakes
Rural Land Construction and
Irrigation System Construction 1995-2000 10
Rural land construction: 30 million mu; Improve
irrigation: 40 million mu.
Drinking Water Supply Facilities 1995-2000 3.5 Provide drinking water supply for about 40 millionpeople and 30 million livestocks
Road Construction 1995-2000 9 Improve rural roads: around 100 thousands kilometers
Small-Scale Water Conservation 1995-2000 1.5 Small-scale water conservation: around 30 thousandssquare kilometers
Table 1.   Basic Background of Yigongdaizhen Projects in China
Source: Documents issued by the National Development and Reform Commission referring to Yigongdaizhen projects,
1985-1995; 1995-2000
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Scheme
Number
Planned
Period In-Kind Goods Invested
Converted
Value of the
Goods
1 1984-87 Cereals, cotton and cloth 2.7
2 1989-91 Medium- and low-grade consumer goods 0.6
3 1990-92 Industrial goods 1.5
4 1991-95 Foodgrains 5
5 1991-95 Foodgrains and industrial goods 10
6 1993-97 Cereals, cloth, edible oil, medium- and low-grade consumer goods 10
Source : Zhu and Jiang (1995) Table 4.1
Table 2. Chinese Government investment in Yigongdaizhen Projects, 1984-93
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Project Number ofProjects
Average
Investment
(yuan)
Average
Labor Used
Benefit
Household
Roads and Bridges 1,556 39101.51 1892.04 459.15
School Construction 983 24168.96 358.22 --
Build Clinic 203 2852.65 64.06 --
Drinking Water 777 29470.35 786.87 286.39
Irrigation System 725 22813.71 516.2 234.96
Drainage System 239 33725.56 433.33 367.33
Electricity 1,939 333854.8 541.42 382.16
Telephone 1,316 450116.2 146.16 205.52
Cable TV or Loudspeaker 771 334177.7 107.73 245.27
Soil Improvement 84 57140.71 1982.52 252.76
Small-Scale Water 191 66634.66 1979.7 224.9
Terrace Construction 216 32158.47 5516.6 124.1
Environment Improvement 181 38186.09 457.57 274.5
Forest Closure 314 19046.14 831.86 225.21
Public Forest 80 18421.82 822.28 366.2
Grain for Green 1,092 87473.31 1429.87 139.63
Meadow Construction 25 99562.75 356.25 54.24
Recreational Center 275 12149.46 105.26 303.9
Not Indicated 178 64934.41 240.33 294.99
All Sample 10,967 158918 887.33 262.95
Table 3. Summary of Statistics of All Public Projects (N=10,967)
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Project Number ofProjects
Average
Investment
(yuan)
Average Labor
Used
Benefit
Household
Roads and Bridges 148 18511.72 2406.39 530
School Construction 41 13125.61 412.33 --
Build Clinic 7 2114.29 124.29 --
Drinking Water 56 12552 1007.27 246.13
Irrigation System 61 18196.33 893.53 298.58
Drainage System 15 9240 580 465.73
Electricity 70 36714.75 1320.78 494.35
Telephone 24 35027.27 1820.52 282.45
Cable TV or Loudspeaker 5 3320 130 784.6
Soil Improvement 16 16713.33 3942 394.88
Small-Scale Water
Conservation 19 8894.74 2342.22 337.16
Terrace Construction 23 8773.81 1785.7 135.32
Environment Improvement 15 6800 461.47 185.6
Forest Closure 9 1200 631.11 215.5
Public Forest 8 6325 1141.67 423.43
Grain for Green 24 7378.75 1755.96 249.17
Meadow Construction 0 0 0 0
Recreational Center 4 5700 107.5 725.5
Not Indicated 4 7250 533.33 935.33
All Sample 549 17249.05 1534.51 342.9
Table 4. Summary of Statistics of Yigongdaizhen Projects (N=549)
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Village Variables in 1997
Income per capita 1457.83 (973.91) 1367.91* (848.71) 1471.72 (991.29)
Total population 1439.40 (1072.93) 1664.12*** (1178.29) 1404.69 (1051.75)
Irrigated land (mu ) 1107.36 (1724.88) 1184.27 (1754.51) 1095.48 (1720.38)
Proportion of land steeper than
25 degrees (%) 24.52 (29.30) 27.25* (31.84) 24.10 (28.87)
The distance from the village
committee seat to the nearest
tarred road
6.75 (23.63) 8.89* (55.85) 6.42 (12.86)
Distance from  village committee
seat to township seat 5.38 (5.30) 5.83 (6.08) 5.31 (5.17)
Number of fellow villagers
working at township 2.32 (4.46) 2.76** (4.50) 2.25 (4.45)
Illiterate person in 1997 59.52 (110.94) 63.27 (87.32) 58.94 (114.16)
Any tarred road passing through
your village? 1=yes; 2=no 1.68 (0.47) 1.71 (0.45) 1.67 (0.47)
Observations 2430 325 2105
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics by Yigong-daizhen Status
Notes.  *** denotes significant at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significant at the 0.05 level; * denotes significant at the 0.1
level. Standard deviation is reported in the parentheses.
All Yigong-daizhen=1 Yigong-daizhen=0
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OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) IV (2SLS)
Yigong-daizhen 41.05*** (8.04) 32.44*** (7.22) 28.48*** (6.83) 10.72 (6.56) 164.38* (90.47)
Village Characteristics in 1997
Net income (log) 6.39 (29.93) 51.13* (29.04) 220.91*** (32.82) 120.70* (66.50)
Net income (log) squared 0.13 (2.28) -3.33 (2.20) -17.20*** (2.51) -9.37* (5.14)
Total population (log) 49.73*** (3.08) 44.66*** (3.22) 23.31*** (2.73) 23.11*** (3.08)
Distance from village to town -0.15 (0.27) -0.18 (0.27) 0.00 (0.27) -0.60 (0.48)
Villagers working in township (person) 0.24 (0.65) 0.09 (0.64) 0.49 (0.61) 0.22 (0.56)
Illiterates (person) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.05* (0.02) 0.04* (0.02)
Access to road (dummy) 23.50*** (4.10) 23.29*** (4.11) 11.99*** (3.93) 10.26** (4.80)
Control for:
Types of project No No Yes Yes Yes
Province FE No No No Yes Yes
First-stage F statistic na na na na 7.17
R-squared 0.02 0.19 0.20 0.31 na
AIC 28886 28445.8 28408.3 28077.9 na
N 2418 2418 2418 2418 2418
Table 6. Impact of Yigong-daizhen Project on Migrant Labor
Dependent Variable: Change of Migrant Labor (person)  
Notes. *** denotes significant at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significant at the 0.05 level; * denotes significant at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
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OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
Yigong-daizhen 1.96 (5.45) 4.02 (5.14) 3.57 (4.81) 1.24 (4.83)
Yigong-daizhen 35.64** (14.10) 26.95** (12.00) 21.59* (13.03) -4.08 (9.84)
Yigong-daizhen 79.60*** (15.68) 60.84*** (13.73) 44.05*** (13.27) 13.46 (13.37)
Yigong-daizhen 48.71** (23.80) 21.79 (22.08) 17.87 (20.17) 10.29 (20.15)
Control for:
Types of project No No Yes Yes
Province FE No No No Yes
Table 7. Impact of Yigong-daizhen on Migration (by Income Quartiles)
Notes. *** denotes significant at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significant at the 0.05 level; * denotes significant at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are reported in the
parentheses. The specifications are the same as reported in Table 6. Only the coefficient on Yigong-daizhen is reported due to space constraints.
Highest quartile by net income in 1997 (N=600)
Dependent Variable: Change of Migrant Labor (person)  
Lowest quartile by net income in 1997 (N=605)
 Second lowest quartile by net income in 1997 (N=614)
Second highest quartile by net income in 1997 (N=599)
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OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
Yigong-daizhen 40.83*** (10.66) 34.69*** (9.77) 29.73*** (8.92) 15.06* (8.40)
Yigong-daizhen 41.45*** (12.13) 29.33*** (10.50) 25.31** (10.75) 2.84 (10.38)
Yigong-daizhen 47.82*** (10.26) 38.71*** (9.21) 35.59*** (8.74) 12.58 (8.50)
Yigong-daizhen 8.16 (8.42) 5.42 (7.95) 6.13 (8.27) 0.26 (8.14)
Control for:
Types of project No No Yes Yes
Province FE No No No Yes
Notes. *** denotes significant at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significant at the 0.05 level; * denotes significant at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are reported in
the parentheses. The specification is exactly the same as reported in Table 6. Only the coefficient on Yigong-daizhen is reported due to space constraints.
Dependent Variable: Change of Migrant Labor (person)  
Panel C: Restricted sample: have road construction project from 1998-2002 (N=1520)
Panel D: Restricted sample: no road construction project from 1998-2002 (N=898)
Panel B: Restricted sample: no productivity improving project from 1998-2002 (N=1315)
Table 8. Impact of Yigong-daizhen on Migration (Hypothesis Tests on Productivity Improvement and Costs Reduction)
Panel A: Restricted sample: have productivity improving project from 1998-2002 (N=1103)
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